Experimental economic approaches to international marketing research

INTRODUCTION
One possible way of figuring out economic laws ... is by controlled experiments. ... Economists [unfortunately] ... cannot perform the controlled experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they generally must be content largely to 0 bserve. (From the economics text of Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985, p. 8 , edited out in later editions)
Unlike traditional economists, who were hesitant to accept experimenta tion as a valid methodology, marketers have long understood its value. ' As is evidenced by the recent proliferation of experimental economic work, economists now also recognize that 'it is indeed possible to generate eco nomic data under controlled conditions, and that by doing so economists are better able to understand existing theories and develop new ones ' (Hey 1991, p. 2) . The goal of this chapter is to discuss the unique value experi mental economics offers researchers in marketing, and the potential this methodology provides in understanding and developing international mar keting theories. Many marketing phenomena are addressed by economic theory: an antique buyer's decision to take a dealer's offer rather than leave it, a premium wine-maker holding its high prices constant in a competiti\'e market, an e-commerce auction company learning which features to add to its web site through trial and error, competing firms deciding on timing of market entry, or channel partners deciding to invest in innovation to increase joint profit and how that profit will be distributed.
Not surprisingly, many of these issues have been studied directly or indi rectly by experimental economists and behavioral game theorists. These examples illustrate the following topics, respectively: ultimatum game~ (antique buyers and sellers), signaling (wine pricing), learning (e-commerce I. mixed strategy equilibria (competitors), and coordination games, trusl games or gift giving (channel relationships).
n that aU the marketing phenomena just mentioned increasingly the global arena with multinational players, experimental economic ~_'lU vlogy provides an additional theory-based tool for international .. rs to deepen our understanding of global marketing transactions ~e1ationships. The remainder of this chapter is an introduction to -ental economics and a discussion of the value it has in advancing tional marketing research. Specifically, the following sections define ~m ics experiments and how they are conducted. Next, three categories _ "' TIomics experiments are introduced with a discussion of the avenues -q iry each provides for international marketing researchers. Finally, -. ~ntial and limitations of the methodology are offered.
RIEF REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
Handbook of Experimental Economics Alvin Roth identifies three . of experimental economic research beginning in the 1930s as ::: initiated more formal streams of experimental investigation that ue today (1995) .2 These experiments all rely on the predictions of : :::d utility theory (EUT) and its concern with precisely specified 'rules _ game' to provide focus to experiments. -first stream of experiments concerns those designed to test theories i\idual choice. The most famous of these is the 'Allais paradox.' _ . a ked subjects to make two hypothetical choices. The first choice was _ n alternatives A and B defined as:
Certainty of receiving 100 million (francs) robability 0.10 of receiving 500 million Probability 0.89 of receiving 100 million Probability 0.0 I of receiving zero _ he second choice was between alternatives C and D defined as . Probability 0. 11 of earning 100 miUion (francs) Probability 0.89 of earning zero Probability 0.10 of receiving 500 million Probability 0.90 of receiving zero 
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An expected utility maximizer who prefers A to B, should also prefer C t D. Allais demonstrated that most people prefer A to B, but then D to C. Ii: the first situation people are unwilling to give up the certainty of winninf 100 million francs for the risk (however small) of receiving nothing. In th.: second situation, the difference in the probabilities is so small, people ar.: often willing to try for the much larger amount. The choices people make in the Allais paradox are consistent with a mOT general theory introduced 25 years later by Kahneman and Tversky (1979 ) Prospect theory, like EUT, has spawned a whole generation of experimen tal research on individual behaviors -focusing on how people interpre · probabilities (e.g. exhibiting a tendency to overweight very small probabil ities and underweight large ones), and how we value losses and gains (e.~ feeling more pain from a loss than pleasure from an equal amount of gain
The second stream of research concerns tests of game-theoretic hypoth eses. In 1950, Dresher and Flood conducted an experiment that continuto have far-reaching influence -in economics, business, psychology, soci . ogy, biology, and political science. Their game, the prisoner's dilemma, pro vided a test of Nash 's prediction (1950) of how rational players wou· behave in a situation in which one's outcome was vulnerable to the play (' another . A 100·fold repetition of the matrix below was conducted betw a fixed pair of subjects who communicated only their choices of row (A B) or column (I or 2). The first number in each cell is the earnings of l l'~ row player and the second number is the earnings of the column player. Subjects were awarded earnings (in pennies) over the 100 repetitions of game. The unique Nash equilibrium is for players to choose (2, I), the seco· row and the first column, in each of the 100 plays (yielding US$O.OO ear ings for the row player, and 50 cents for the column player over the hundr rounds). For the row player, (B) is better than (A) no matter what the col Uf'" player chooses (0) -I, I > 1/2). For the column player, ( I) is better than _ no matter what the row player does (2) I, 1/2> I). However, this outc is inefficient. If players would instead play (1,2) in every period, their e ings over the 100 rounds would be 50 cents for the row player, and USS I for the column player. Thus, equilibrium play is less profitable than coo ~ ative play. The Dresher and Flood results have been replicated time again; people tend to choose strategies that leave them with payoffs far fr~ equilibrium, but also that fall short of complete cooperation.
~.: prisoner's dilemma has motivated hundreds of experiments testing h level of cooperation responds to various kinds of manipulation. y finding of relevance to researchers studying channels relationships ~ e\'en in repeated games in which cooperation usually unravels, coop _ n may occur at the end due to players' motivations to build reputa _~ the type of player who will cooperate when faced with cooperation _ -tal. 1982).
~_e early game theoretic experiments illustrated important issues in m ental design and theory testing. Experimenters came to understand -that affect behavior; for example, playing the game repeatedly or nee, possessing knowledge of one's own and the partner's payoffs or ~ Lions, providing incentives proportional to payoffs in the games, and _ 'ng payoffs such that one becomes more prominent than another 1995). Regarding this last point, Schelling demonstrated that in • situations the problem facing economic agents is one of coordina d thus, by focusing on outcomes that might be 'prominent' some of __ ts of coordination failure may be avoided. As Roth notes, Schelling's _5 are a lesson to experimenters to be acutely aware of the details of :he experiment is being conducted and the influence they might have ~ bavior, even if those details do not directly concern the theory being __ ( (995).
-... third stream of research in experimental economics concerns the .:: ..:HZation and functioning of markets. In 1948, Chamberlin designed an --........' rnental market with known supply and demand curves. Chamberlin ~ a method of inducing the aggregate supply and demand curves of -et by providing each buyer or seller with a reservation price for each ey demand or supply. This method of induced valuation continues idely used to study various forms of market organization, and has -~escribed as 'the crux move in the development of experimental eco _ . (Camerer forthcoming) . ..Jding on this work, Smith embarked on a fruitful series of experi tending to produce environments in which competitive equilibrium be observed (1962) . His double auction market is such an environ results show convergence of auction prices toward competitive equi ...m within a few rounds. Importantly, in a later experiment Smith uced his results (involving hypothetical payments) with results l ng real monetary payments. Research on double auction markets ues today -having evolved from demonstrating that competitive . rium can occur, to greater investigation of the causes and conditions ~r \\'hich it does occur.
--~e three streams of early experimental economic work precipitated a _ growth of the field in the 1960s and 1970s and explosive growth in the 1980s and I 990s, bringing experimentation into the 'mainstream' of tra ditional economics (Roth 1995) .3 Importantly, this work set a foundation for the research that followed it. First, this early research elevated the concern for testing general theories in specific, controlled environments. Second, it began the evolution in methodological protocols -providin g guidelines regarding how to conduct economic experiments, and wha: factors need be controlled to yield the clearest interpretation of how the results address theory.
CONDUCTING ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS
The discussion in the previous section was an introduction to experimenta economics -meant to provide a rough understanding of its history and tl:.: issues investigated. This section will present a brief 'how to' guide to cor. ducting economic experiments internationally. In the next section three 'uses· of experimental economics will be presented accompanied by a discussion how international marketers also might employ this methodology.
Experimental Design
For experimental economists, the beauty of their method lies in the sirr. plicity of their (experimental) games. Camerer (forthcoming) stat 'Simple games are particularly useful because only one or two basic prine. pies are needed to make a prediction. If the prediction is wrong, we km'" which principles are at fault, and the results usually suggest an alternati· principle which predicts more accurately' (p. 7). Because economic theory rarely specifies how adding realistic details \\ affect behavior in a given situation, these details are left out of the expen mental design. Essentially, what experimental subjects face is a very bare bones context, where behaviors (such as cooperation, trust, or fairness) aT_ measured by a common metric, and differences in these behaviors ar_ starkly revealed through statistical analysis and control.
As an example of such a game, a standard experimental approach u ~ to demonstrate the role of fairness in bargaining is the ultimatum gam This game allows us to quantifiably measure the extent to which barga· ing behavior deviates from the purely self-interested (subgame) perf equilibrium; this deviation is attributed to concerns for fairness (Th· 1988) .4 By comparing deviations from the equilibrium across subject pO D for example, we can determine the extent to which concerns for fai m enter into bargaining behaviors across contexts, cultures, or countries.
In an ultimatum game the ' buyer' is given an amount, say, US$I 0, an divide it in any way she chooses with the 'seller'. At the same time, I r is told to list the minimum amount he would accept from the _~ If the buyer's offer equals or exceeds the seller's minimum demand, 'l"er is accepted, and the two players divide the money as proposed by ... ~ er. If the buyer's offer is less than the seller's demand, the offer is ._ . and neither player receives anything. Since any amount of money c : · . =f than no money, the self-interested utility-maximizing buyer should nd the seller should demand) the smallest amount over zero; this nt E, is the equilibrium.s temptation to add contextual details to such a game scenario is ~. especially when conducting cross-cultural research. However, bal = this temptation is the need to preserve consistency in meaning of the rio across cultures, and preserving the clarity our results provide _ -_iu g theories of off-equilibrium behavior. For example, while the t of salary negotiations might provide a rich and relevant context, _ ntext would have different meanings among say, Japanese and an subjects. Any differences in behavior that result would likely be .mded by differences in contextual salience across the subject pools. tions _,--onomics experiment should have a clear instructional script, which precise replication; this is crucial when running an experiment subject pools that vary in language. These instructions ensure that t::; know what decision they will be making, how they will make it, .;.Ud where they should record it, and the possible outcomes (Croson ming) . _ "mmon convention is that the instructions include a quiz with hypo I examples of decisions. Providing this quiz not only ensures that _~s understand the game they are about to play, but also provides the her with confidence that the results are not influenced by subject ".. derstanding .
.. tionally, instructions should be read aloud in the experimental room of all subjects, thereby operationalizing 'common knowledge' (all ' 5 know that all other subjects have received the same information) . assumed in economic theory. Of course, some experiments are ;;: ed to test asymmetric information conditions. Here, all subjects .i be explicitly told that some participants are informed, and some are 
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Anonymity If subjects know the identity of the person with whom they interact, thi5 knowledge is likely to influence their behavior. Furthermore, these social effects of knowledge of the partner's identity are exacerbated in culturwhere 'face saving' behaviors or the need or desire to behave in sociall: acceptable ways -are prominent (throughout most of East Asia, for example) (Bond and Hwang 1995) . To reduce the likelihood of sucr. demand effects (pleasing others in the experiment or pleasing the experi menter) many researchers take the precaution of running experiments witl double-blind procedures; subjects are anonymous to other subjects, anc subjects are anonymous to the experimenter.
Incentives
It is rare today to see an experiment published in an economics journal tha: does not use monetary, non-hypothetical payments. Yet, the evidenc.: remains mixed as to whether payment, and how much, significantly influ ences behavior in economic games -and the debate involving the relati\';:: efficacy (and cost) of using performance-based incentives in experiment remains lively. Thaler (1987) reviews many studies in which the differencC"~ between real and hypothetical payments did not yield important differencC".! in results. He states, 'Asking purely hypothetical questions is inexpensive. fast, and convenjent. This means that many more experiments can be ru r with much larger samples than is possible in a monetary-incentives methoology ' (p. 120) . Despite this, the strong tradition and preference for performance-bas incentives continues in economics, likely prompted by deeper philosophica. concerns as stated by Croson (forthcoming), 'In economics, the validity the experiment rests on the link between behavior and payoffs. If subjeC" are deceived about that link, the validity of their decisions is called int( doubt ' (p. 31) .
Cross-country Controls
The international character of our research warrants that we control spe cific variables that could influence results for country or culture. Wit!u economics, these controls were first addressed by Roth et al. (1991) in thmulti-country comparison of bargaining behavior. oUing for Subject Pool Equivalency . g that subjects are as similar as possible is a daunting task. For pk. the demographics of a 'typical' college junior in each country are · I be influenced by gender (one experiment I ran had a 90 per cent · -ubject pool in Korea versus a 50 per cent male pool in the USA), age rlal1y countries students complete mjlitary service before beginning .ge ). intelligence or wealth (in many developing countries only a minute • lage of people attend college, versus 40-50 per cent in the USA), or -taken in college (many countries do not have business schools as in _. A. leaving one to decide if an economics major, for example, is _ ent to a marketing major). However, the researcher must try to _.e maximum equivalency by, for example, selecting students from rly tiered universities in each country. If the researcher believes that _mer demographic factors, such as gender or income, may influence r. these variables should be added to the analysis as covariates.
lling for Currency Effects _sing power parity can be controlled for by choosing denominations -.it the monetary incentives relative to subject income and living stan .tee approximately equal. Camerer (forthcoming) provides three sug : (I) converting a baseline sum into local currency, (2) controlling 5 in terms of labor supply by equalizing number of hours of work -00 to earn the stake amount, and (3) in less developed cultures, con g a cost-of-living index by measuring local prices of commonly lling for Language Effects lI ing for any nuances in language is crucial lest these nuances influ nsistency in meaning of instructions across countries. The standard is to have all experimental materials translated and back-translated ~ _ ' parate external translators.
Uing for Experimenter Effects _nt ioned previously, the identity and the behavior of the experimenter uence subjects' behavior. The worst option for an experimenter is e separate experimenters in each country -thus confounding whether ;nificant results are due to real culture differences or to differences in ~ nner in which the experimenter behaved or was perceived in each country. A better option is to have each experimenter conduct experiments in different cultures -thereby allowing estimation of an experimenter main effect. When running multi-country experiments, I have done the following . First, I was present when each experiment was being run to ensure equi\· alency of procedures (room layout, presentation of instructions, etc.). Second, an extremely thorough protocol was designed (and translated and back-translated) based upon the procedure used in the USA and used to train experimenters in each country. The protocol included information such as the positioning of the experimenter in the room, and the method to be used in answering subject questions. Third, I trained all experimenters and conducted a pilot session with them.
THREE CATEGORIES OF ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS
Addressing the question of what is the purpose of economic experiments Roth suggested a categorization based on how the experiments are moti vated and their audience (1995) . Although most experiments contain ele ments of more than one category, roughly, the uses of experimentation divide into three. First are experiments that 'Speak to Theorists' -that a designed to address economic theory. Second are experiments that 'Searcl for Facts' -that are designed to study the effects of variables (the anoma lies) about which theory has little to say. Third are experiments tha: 'Whisper in the Ears of Princes' -that are designed to inform public polic:.
These categories are helpful in that they point out areas where interna tional marketers too can address theory and speak to specific audiences theorists in our field, economists, and policy makers. Given that relative.:. little work has been conducted internationally in experimental economil.: and almost no work has appeared in international marketing using tbe methodology, these three categories provide ample opportunity for conmer researchers interested in individual decision making, channels a .: strategy researchers interested in game theory, and public policy researche interested in market structure, to study and increase our understanding ' . important economic phenomena. In this section I present some intern ... tional work from economics and other fields that has been conducted with each of these categories, and discuss potential areas research for marketer:
Experiments Addressing Theory
One body of theory-addressing research that has attracted attention fro international researchers concerns risk aversion. Camerer (1995) describ -., ntrary to formal economic models of thirty years ago, today 's . _ -assume that decision makers make choices under risk and uncer ._ . oyer time. However, as the models grow more complex, decision .LttS are assumed to have more rationality -making it more likely that odels will be violated . It is in this way that individual decision-making ~_ arch can speak to economic theory -providing the how and why of tionality violations.
--\ fascinating stream of such research initiated by Weber and Hsee (1998 , 99) uses different methods of risk-taking assessment (e.g. pairwise -oices between gambles and sure amounts or willingness-to-pay for risky Lions) to compare behaviors internationally. They show that respondents -. ill China are less risk-averse in risky financial decisions than their _ unterparts in the United States. To account for these robust results, "cber and Hsee propose the 'cushion hypothesis ' (1999) : 'members of 'ally collectivist cultures, such as the Chinese culture, can afford to take = ;lter financial risks because their social networks insure them against cat --ophic outcomes. The social network serves as a "cushion" which could '1 ct the person if she took risks and fell "ill '" (p. 14). 'he cushion hypothesis yields a number of predictions, tested by Weber . Hsee. They demonstrate first , that the size and quality of a respon -:'s social network serves as a mediating factor between nationality and preference. (Not surprisingly, Chinese have much larger and stronger networks than Americans.) Second, that Chinese are significantly Te risk-seeking than Americans in financial domains, but not in other ins such as academic or medical decisions. In these other domains, _. suggest, it would be more difficult for a social network to provide a y should something go wrong (Hsee and Weber 1999). ": addition to the work by Weber and Hsee, there have also been rich .:lllS of research investigating cultural influence on probability judg -:5 (e.g. Yates 1989 ) and on culture and risk perception (e.g. Bontempo 1997), which also shed light on economic decision-making interna Iy.
ues for International Marketing Research search demonstrates the value and contribution that a careful and ted international researcher can make to our understanding of eco -behavior. All of this research informs the how and why of 'irrational' j 11 making. Yet, importantly, it also expands boundaries in that it ~ at factors, such as risk aversion, which may have been assumed to be .-·,\·ired to the human race (based mainly on studies conducted in . st), and demonstrates that there are significant differences in these 200
Cross-cultural research issues processes across cultures. Therein lies the opportunity for international marketing researchers. The area of behavioral decision research has become prominent in mar keting in the last decade, phenomena such as mental accounting, intertem poral choice, framing effects, the endowment effect, and risk aversion, to name a few, are common currency in the language of consumer research ers. Yet, there are few, if any, published studies that have examined these phenomena on a cross-cultural basis. As shown by the work of Weber and Hsee, making such an examination, and providing a deeper explanation for any differences (or similarities) in cross-cultural effects greatly enhances our understanding of such phenomena, and of how they operate across cul tures. This allows us to think more specifically about the implications of these cultural differences for how consumers buy, sellers sell, and agents in firms interact on a global basis.
EXPERIMENTS ADDRESSING ANOMALIES
A second category of economic experiment demonstrates the influence of factors -anomalies -not captured by theoretical models. 'An experimental result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to "rationalize" or if implaus ible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the (self-interested, ratio nal) paradigm ' (Camerer and Thaler 1995, p. 209) . The anomalies 1 concentrate on in this section focus on norms.
In 1991, Roth et al. compared behavior in a two-person bargaining situ ation (the ultimatum game) with behavior in a multiple person market em·i ronment in Japan, Israel, the Slovak Republic and the United States. Eacr. game was repeated for ten rounds with different anonymous partners in each round . In the bargaining and market environments, the uniqu (subgame) perfect equilibrium was that one player would receive all til wealth (or almost all when payoffs were discrete). The authors demon strated that outcomes in the market environment converged very quickly t[ equilibrium everywhere, with no relevant payoff differences across coun tries. Outcomes from the bargaining environment however remained differ ent from the equilibrium across all rounds, and substantial differences j offers and rejection rates were revealed across countries (with the cliff , ences increasing as the rounds progressed). Specifically, offers in the US . and Slovenia (mean = 45 per cent of the pie) tended to be more gener than those in Japan and Israel (10 per cent lower). Despite the lower oft! rejection rates in Japan and Israel were no higher than rates in the other countries. Roth et al. conclude, ' the subject-pool differences observed · this experiment are related to different expectations about what constitu ~ ' : ble offer, rather than different propensities to trespass on a tion of what constitutes an acceptable offer ' (1991 , p. 1092) . To y behavior converged to equilibrium in the market game but did ultimatum game, they state 'The observed bargaining behavior is _~_ : ed by concerns about fairness which are context dependent and do :n the market environment' (Roth et al. 1991 (Roth et al. , p. 1093 . uestion of what is fair, what contextual factors influence fairness, ~ relationship between fair beliefs and actual behavior, prompted a _ .' Buchan et al. looking again at a repeated ultimatum game in Japan USA (2002). Our experiment differed from the Roth et al. (1991) _~e nt in key ways. First, we manipulated the balance of power ~n the players in the experiment. Second , in addition to observing -r.
we asked subjects what they believed was the fair offer or demand. -_ '.\e ran the ultimatum game using a different method from Roth et e conducted the experiment using the 'strategy method'; buyers and . --submit their offers and demands, the two are matched and if the d is equal to or less than the offer, the division is made as proposed ~ buyer. Roth et al. ran their ultimatum experiment usjng the 'game ,xL the buyer's offer is presented to the seller, and the seller accepts or
e suggested that collectivists would behave differently in the strategy ultimatum game than would individually oriented subjects. Spec i .. \\'e proposed that subjects from Japan, a relatively more collectivist :e. would prefer divisions that were closer to an even split of the pie, ~ou\d the more individuahst American subjects. This hypothesis was -ported , with offers and demands about 12 per cent higher in Japan than ~ USA. We also suggested that power would have a more differential >n e in Japan than in the USA. In the USA, people relate to power as ans to an end in a negotiation; Japanese peo ple tend to view power as :-more relational. Sociologist Doi (1971) explains that in Japan, soci rms dictate th at the more powerful party is responsible, in part, for ell-being of the less powerful. Thus, we hypothesized that whereas _T' . by a more powerful partner in the USA would decrease (relative to ndition where power was equal between the partners), offers by a ~ powerful partner in Japan would actually increase. Interestingly, this 'llhesis was not supported in Japan by actual behavior data , but was rted by data showing what subjects believed to be the fair behavior. _, ~ results highlight the relationship between behavior and fairness . [ in the ultimatum game. In regression analyses, fairness beliefs nted for only 16 per cent of the variance in offers or demands, sug ng that while fairness is a component motivating behavior in the game, -I~. other motivations, such as strategy, are salient as well.
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One noteworthy result is our failure to replicate Roth et al. 's results: although American offers and demands were not significantly different across the two experiments, in our experiment Japanese offers were more generous, and the rejection rate was higher in Japan than in the USA. This difference is interesting in that its roots may lie in the differing experimen tal methods used, thus highlighting the value of using various methods to tap into different cultural tendencies. Prior research on cross-cultural nego tiation styles demonstrates that the divergence between intended action and action taken is larger among Japanese negotiators than among American negotiators (Ohbuchi and Takahashi 1994) . This implies that in the Roth et al. game method , Japanese sellers may have accepted lower offers as they were presented them (not wanting to say 'no'), although if given a chance beforehand, their stated minimum acceptable offer may have been higher.
The results of these two studies suggest cultural and methodological explanations for the differences in 'fair' behavior observed in Japan and the USA. From an anthropologist's view, however, these two cultures are actu ally very similar. A much more dramatic anthropologist-led bargaining study examined behavior in 12 small-scale cultures (including Peru's Machiguenga farmers, Paraguay's Ache headhunters, and Indonesia'5 Lamerlara whalers). This study reveals startling differences in behavior across cultures and addresses the influence of market development on off equilibrium behavior (Henrich et at. 2001) . For example, Machiguengas. culture which is extremely isolated socially and economically, offered muc. less in the ultimatum game than has been observed in any other subjec pool -with a mode at 15 per cent, and only one rejected offer. A t the othe: extreme, the Ache headhunters and Lamelara whalers, cultures where po: latch is common, exhibited more generosity than seen with any oth subject pool-offering more than half on average.
In regression analyses two variables account for the variance in offe T across the 12 cultures (R2=0.68) . Cultures with more cooperative acti\'i . (e.g. collective hunting of whales) and market integration (an index com bining the existence of a national language, a labor market for cash wag and farming of crops for cash) have sharing norms closer to equal split This research very quickly caught the attention of economists. After a..... it was Adam Smith who observed that markets are effective because of baker's pursuit of self-interest rather than his generosity. This research su: gests something different: that a great deal of real world, 'enculturated market experience tempers rather than amplifies the pursuit of self-inter ~.
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The increased interest among economists in behaviors prompted by norms uch as fairness has been concurrent with the increased recognition in mar . ting of the importance of shared norms within the channel relationship. The existence of these norms, if shared, provides a means of communica ti n and control (Weitz and Jap 1995; Heide and John 1992) , and has been hown to increase the performance of both the channel and individual ~h annel members (Lusch and Brown 1996) . Given this converging interest norms, experimental economics may offer a different and interesting new ' e to the study of the influence of norms on international trading agree ,." nts and behavior. The Roth et al. (1991) and Buchan et al. (200Ia) :~udies demonstrate the possibilities of measuring the strength of a norm ally, Croson and Buchan (1999) crossed gender with country in their ..uysis and demonstrate that while men and women trust equally, women d to be more reciprocal (which encourages future trust and cooperation.) with the work on fairness, this research on trust demonstrates the poten l!conomic experiments provide for examining the influence and possible ~ ;::ra ction of cultural and contextual factors on norms and strategic behav --:: that have important ramifications on international marketing research -_ practice.
JiYen that international experimental economic research is in its infancy,
.ere are many topics yet to be explored. As just two examples, one might Iy Hall's work on high and low context cultures (1959) to the implemen for marketers in that it alerts us to the need to better understand the role of market development in influencing (possibly dynamic) norms and subse quent economic behavior.
Experiments That Testbed Policies
When new policies are being considered, an experiment can be run to testbed the policy, investigate and hopefully illuminate any unintended con sequences, and to suggest parameters that policy makers might consider ir: their final implementation (Croson forthcoming). The greatest triumph of this line of inquiry is evidenced in the applica tion of game theory to the auctions of airwaves to telecommunications companies. In several different countries, regulatory agencies decided t put airwave spectrum up for auction. Ideally, the auctions would rai government revenue, and ensure that a public resource is awarded to the firms who are most able to create value from it. In most countries, the auc tions were designed in collaboration with game theorists whose testbeddinf helped detect any unanticipated weaknesses in proposed designs (Camerer. forthcoming).
Avenues for International Marketing Research
Interestingly, two articles have appeared in marketing journals in the pas: five years urging greater game theoretic exploration of the method b: which products are sold, and how efficiency might be increased (McAtee and McMillan 1996; Bazerman 2001) . The advent of global electroni markets (in B2B, B2C, and C2C) provides an exciting forum for intern.1 tional researchers to better understand the implications of various mark!!: structures for buyers and sellers (e.g. differences in behavior in aucti 11. markets). Additionally, marketing researchers could make a valuable con tribution to understanding and prompting efficient market developmen' internationally. In discussing various testbed experiments involvi ~ markets for computer resources, gas, and electrical power grids, Friedma and Sunder state, 'Given the accelerating pace of transformation in the fi. v merly centrally planned economies and given continuing deregulation ' Western countries, the scope for institutional engineering of this sort . large and increasing ' (1994, p. 9 ).
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Experimelllal economic approaches E LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL OF . rOMIe EXPERIMENTS final section I will address the most commonly mentioned limitations methodology (as discussed by Croson forthcoming), but also reiter .~ p otential for advancing our knowledge of marketing phenomena. .. common objection of this methodology has to do with the nature -~ su bject pool; specifically questioning whether the behavior of college graduates represents what real business people would do. A first -is that students are people too, and in fact, represent the profession e lomorrow. A more scientific defense lies in the fact that multiple 'ments have been conducted using student and professional demon n g no significant differences in behavior. For example, Dyer et al. found no significant differences in bidding behavior of experienced -5 executives in construction compared to that of students and ' ;' po et al. (1997) also found no differences in risk aversion among nts versus security analysts. . ond objection deals with the size of the monetary payoffs; specifi that stakes commonly used in experiments are too small to induce ~a l behavior. Interestingly, a number of international experiments (at '\\'0 dozen in fact) address this argument. Experiments have been con .:cd in developing countries where purchasing power is so low that : ::,1 sums (by developed-country standards), amount to several weeks' onths of pay. For example, Cameron (1999) conducted the ultimatum -_ in Indonesia, manipulating a 40-fold change in stakes from 5000 to orupiah -allowing some subjects to leave with the equivalent of : m onths expenditures. A robust conclusion of these experiments is fe5ults under higher stakes conditions are generally very close to those , lower stakes.
fin al objection to this methodology usually involves external validity; ~ .:a n these simple games tell us about transactions in the real world? The _ _=c situation can be scaled down to their barest elements -players, ~ation , actions, outcomes -in order to best teach readers what to look hat behaviors to expect, and how they might behave in response. In ~ that is the value of this methodology as well; it allows us to map situations onto simple games in order to best understand the implica of behavior (Camerer forthcoming). However, once we have that initial _-"clanding, we have every reason to build upon it to better model and __ rstand the more complex situation we actually face. As Camerer states, ts about generalizability are a demand for more elaborate experi . not a dismissal of the experimental method ... More ambitious :"iments with teams of players, complex environment, communication,
